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Abstract 
Emerging markets real estate performance is nowadays heavily affected by lack of investor confidence, risk 
perceptions, increasing cost of finance and finally market fundamentals. In turn, banks have looked away from 
real estate as their balance sheets are loaded with non-performing commercial real estate loans. While the 
blame for debt excesses is being placed on one party (banks) or another (investors) we take an in depth look at 
a real estate development company active in Romania in order to understand the effects of leverage. We are 
trying to answer basic questions in real estate investment, in a Romanian context: is there an intrinsic need for 
debt financing in real estate? What should be considered a sustainable level of debt in an emerging market such 
as Romania? What are the risks stemming from too much debt and how should they be managed? The 
conclusions are limited by the focus on a single company but the company is what could be called a 
representative case for the Romanian investment market.  
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The last real estate driven financial crisis has been thoroughly investigated and conclusions were drawn 
about behavioral economics, interest rates, risk management and many other interesting subjects. Romanian 
real estate, as a phenomenon at the frontier of the Western born real estate boom, was however rarely 
considered for research bar for the international consultancies assisting investors in the region. Distant as it is 
from the center, the real estate development and investment spree worked however in much the same manner as 
in more mature economies, fueled by bank lending and strong demand, only that everything happened on a fast 
track forward during the course of, say, 4-5 years. We are trying to shed light into the rationality that led to 
such a fast expansion and contraction of a market that was simply non-existent at the end of the 90s by 
investigating the characteristics of decision making related to the projects developed by the local subsidiary of 
a European developer. In doing so we are trying to understand the decision making rationality at work when 
significant levels of debt are accessed, risks are overlooked and rewards are overestimated.  
Regarding the methodology, we start by taking a look at the Romanian real estate financing market as the root 
of the property investment meta-narrative and move to the concrete company level approach in trying to 
understand the risk/reward trade-off and the consequences for the company. At company level we have 
conducted a series of non-structured interviews with management and operational staff in the local subsidiary 
and we also had several meetings with the general management of the group. We have gathered data about the 
projects and we had access to project calculation sheets, financing contracts, cost variance reports. We 
interpreted the data in relation to the wider market context. 
 
2. Romanian Real Estate financing market 
 
Generally speaking, real estate investment markets start developing in countries which have a stable 
institutional system, transparent economy, growth, liquid capital markets and stable financing and socio-
economic environment. There is a wide consensus in the literature that the rapid development of the financial 
sector in the CEE played a major role in the growth and convergence of the real estate industries in these 
countries Gardo and Martin, 2010. To understand the reasons for which even as late as the end of 2008 the 
Romanian real estate investment market was still attractive for investors we can take a look at a construction 
market analysis by Deloitte, 2008, after the start of the subprime crises, quoting a number of reasons which 
make the CEE real estate market attractive for foreign capital: 
 low vacancy levels in commercial real estate, as an example Romania and Bulgaria standing at 5% for 
prime office locations. 
 in the retail sector, an existing stock below the levels of European average, with a Romanian average at 25 
sqm/1000 inhabitants while Poland had 142 sqm, Spain 248, Netherlands 319 and the EU 27 average 
standing at 205 sqm. 
 the hotel sector experienced a steady increase in the number of tourists for years (annual increase between 
2000 and 2007 standing at 4.7% compared with European average at 2.7%) 
 in the industrial sector, the demand for industrial spaces was on the rise following growth in commerce, 
infrastructure development and transit of goods between Eastern and Western Europe. 
As a newly arrived member in the club of countries that were targeted by international real estate 
investment, Romania had a less sophisticated range of financing products- mainly straightforward mortgage 
loans. The products available in Romania were in a way maybe closer to the German financing market, for 
years dominated by pure mortgage lending Ilblher and Lucios, 2003 -in this case probably due to the 
conservative nature of the financial system.  In early 2000 conditions were set for Romania to be on the way 
towards a steep aggressive development of the real estate financing sector. In the beginning the residential 
market saw what was perceived as an exotic product - widely available mortgages - and asset prices responded 
quickly to the liquidity splash. Subsequently the commercial real estate sector, still in its infancy at the end of 
90s, saw the first commercial developments financed with the help of the classic combination between equity 
and bank loans. In relative terms, while the markets of Poland, Check Republic and Hungary where already 
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quite developed and the first institutional transactions were taking place, in Romania the financing market was 
testing the use of the first commercial real estate senior debt schemes.  
The development landscape was quite prolix at the time with a combination of developers specialized in 
CEE now probing the new frontier (like GTC), Austrian funds/developers with the advantage of proximity and 
historical ties to Romania (Europolis, Immofinanz), as well as quite a number of entrepreneurs that saw the 
ingredients to functional real estate development market: there was a lack of lending from banks (much like 
nowadays) and a lack of institutional investors willing to buy the stabilized investment. The advent of one saw 
rapidly the arrival of the other so that by 2003 the Romanian market had all the right elements to take off, much 
later than markets to the west but having a great potential for growth and investment yield compression. 
The financing instruments for real estate were plain vanilla, non-sophisticated senior debt loans with some 
institutions offering more complex mezzanine products for junior debt. Most of the loans had linear 
amortization built in, while towards the end of the bubble, in 2008, more complex bullet loans were available. 
The banks that financed the take-off of the real estate financing market were a mixture of Austrian, Greek 
and French institutions with more or less local experience in real estate development. The lack of expertise was 
widely the problem with the real estate development industry in Bucharest and this was coupled with a lack of 
expertise in the banks real estate departments, causing a rapidly inflating bubble. Loan to value stood at 75-
85%, with various requirements regarding pre-lease or pre-sale. Often these requirements could be replaced by 
a convenient market study with a reputable international consulting company that could demonstrate the 
existence of demand for the location and the product. 
Many developers were raising capital as equity, senior or junior debt in more complex capital markets and 
were investing the funds in Romania. Even some more exotic US REITs made their present felt together with 
opportunity funds managed by familiar names like, among others, Lehman Brothers or, say, Warburg Pincus. 
This created a situation in which some of the products that were financed from sources outside of Romania 
were 100% leveraged. At the time, the professionals from more sophisticated real estate markets considered the 
requirement of 85% loan to value ratio on the local financing market to be excessive. Another new 
development was that after 2005 the arrival of the institutional investors was putting the Romanian market on 
the investment map of Europe, as the Institutional investors, i.e. insurance companies, pension funds, 
 Xu Ye, 2010. 
Towards the end of the period (2008), in order to take advantage of the very concrete investment race (the so 
called race to deploy capital), some of the pension funds, usually core investors, started taking development 
risks and pre-financed or pre-bought projects in unusual, pioneering locations. In the same time banks felt 
compelled to start financing land transactions, in effect contributing to the fast inflating bubble. In the summer 
of 2008, long after the subprime crises was in full swing in US, the bank funded development spree was 
already creating a market with pricing levels that were alarmingly high, unsustainable and non-aligned with 
market fundamentals, and after all, common sense. As the purpose of our research is to understand the concrete 
way in which companies took advantage of the financing market and made, for lack of a better word, profit, we 
will describe the circumstances of the four different projects that we analyzed in order to paint a clearer picture 
of the way in which investors understood the potential of the Romanian real estate market, seized the 
opportunity and invested fast and furious. 
 
3.The company 
 
The company that was the focus of our research is the subsidiary of an international group active in several 
countries in Western, Central and Eastern Europe. The company is privately owned and the business model is 
based on the common real estate development cycle that starts with the identification of potential target 
countries, continues with identifying local capabilities and mixing them with home market expertise, 
identifying sectors for investment, specific projects and funding sources. The buildings are either pre-leased or 
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leased during development/construction (due to strong demand particularly in asset poor Eastern Europe) and 
after stabilizing the investment, the buildings are sold to long term core investors (pensions and insurance funds 
etc.). These long term holders of properties require lower investment yields from stable secure properties with 
long term tenants, of good quality, in proper locations, preferably with a low asset management intensity 
profile. 
In practice the asset cycle starts with the end -the satisfaction of the buyer- and as a consequence this 
means the quiet enjoyment of ownership for the long term holder and the quiet enjoyment of occupancy for the 
tenant. As such the role of the developer in the cycle is to create and to bring to life such commercial real estate 
investment products. In the process the developer is making, in theory, a hefty profit but in the same time he 
ensures the fulfillment of a social need: the need for industrial buildings, for office buildings, for shopping 
centers etc. 
In the case of the company in question the development process was managed through a mix of home 
based management and local capabilities, with a local Romanian team of 7 people handling projects. Most of 
the consultancy work was out sourced - legal, technical supervision and project management, cost and quality 
control etc. The small team had the advantage that operational gearing was avoided and the capabilities could 
be extended or reduced through outsourcing depending on the work load for specific projects. This business 
recipe has been followed by roughly all the foreign developers that are active on the markets of emerging 
Eastern European economies, including Romania.  
 
4.The funding dilemma- company projects 
 
As showed by a wide literature, the funding dilemma either explained by the trade-off theory of capital 
structure or by the pecking order theory of capital structure, is a very real and concrete problem. Except for the 
case of cash reach investors that had access to cheap sources of equity and debt from external capital markets 
(such as US REITs), most of the typical investors are confronted with allocating very limited amounts of 
capital to a number of projects in such a way as to minimize risks and  maximize returns. 
Traditionally the real estate model has been one that easily qualified for bank lending due to its concrete, 
tangible value. The literature has looked many times into the reasons for which real estate bubbles contributed 
to most of the financial crises in the world, as well as into the reasons for overvaluing properties, lending sprees 
etc. This particular study takes a look at the ways in which a specific company takes advantage of the specific 
restrictions and opportunities created by the funding dilemma on the Romanian market. 
 
Project A 
 
The office building A is a project developed on 1,600 square meters of land in downtown Bucharest, very 
close to the Victoriei square. The building has a built surface of 8,474 square meters and a net leasable surface 
of 5,200 square meters and was built in little more than a year time. The development cycle has been the classic 
one, with land being bought in early 2006 by the developer debt free, at a cost of 1,900 Euro/sqm, and the total 
cost of development, including land and financing, standing at slightly over Euro 14 million. The equity 
contribution from the developer was Euro 3.5 million and included the land and some of the architectural costs. 
The developer obtained from the bank a loan at 75% loan to cost ratio and a variable interest of approximately 
6.5% (spread and cost of funds). In this case the investment (long term) loan was at a lower rate (6.5 %) and the 
construction/development loan had a slightly higher cost (7.2%) in order to compensate the lender for the 
potential risks stemming from the development process.  The loan was obtained without the requirement for 
previous pre-lease arrangements, with the help of a feasibility/market study prepared by an international 
consultancy based in Romania. The study predicted correctly that the building would be leased during 
development. The design and construction period went relatively smoothly with only the expected hurdles on 
the construction front (quality of construction difficult to achieve, cost of iron varying wildly on the 
international markets etc.) followed by the long drawn negotiations with prospective tenants. The building was 
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leased before completion to a mix of high standing international and local tenants for headline rents between 19 
and 21 Euro per sqm (BOMA). After the building was leased, in effect before closing the last contracts, 
negotiations were started through the aid of an investment agent with a number of 16 (!) investors, potential 
buyers, and a transaction was closed at a price of approximately Euro 21.7 mil. 
The process was by no means simple and the recipe of success by no means ensured, however, such 
straightforward development made it look like this was a process that could be easily handled and could 
produce very attractive returns: the equity in contribution stood at Euro 3.5 mil and the equity out stood at 
approximately Euro 7.4 mil. For the equity investor (the developer) this type of investment made perfect sense. 
The bank and the long term holder however were now in a situation where the loan provisions were about to be 
soon breached by lower property values and the process of marking the property to market, by decreasing rents 
and voids induced by tenant defaults, in effect by a much grimmer future.  
 
Project B 
 
The second project pursued by the company consists of a built-to-suit industrial development in a city in 
western Romania. The 79,000 square meters of land were acquired by the landlord in 2005 at 21 Euro per 
square meter and were located on the outskirts of the city in an industrial area close to the outer ring road, with 
direct access to a national road. 
Through intense marketing efforts a potential industrial tenant was identified and subsequently a long term 
(12 years) lease was concluded, allowing for the development of a 25,000 square meters industrial building that 
was developed in such a way so as to allow rapid conversion to a warehousing facility upon termination of the 
current contract.  Total land costs stood at Euro 1.8 mil, infrastructure development approximately Euro 0.6 
million, construction costs at Euro 7.9 million, permitting costs Euro 0.15 million, marketing and agent fees at 
0.3 million, total development costs Euro 11.4 million. The building was highly complex with a high 
proportion of office space. The existence of the built-to-suit/ long term lease contract with an international 
reputable industrial company allowed the developer to easily access bank funding, with a 65% Loan-to-value 
(higher loan-to-cost) ratio. The building was sold 6 months after occupancy to another industrial developer who 
wanted to take advantage of the possibilities to acquire more adjoining land using the current infrastructure in 
order to further develop the industrial park into a larger facility. The selling price was Euro 15.3 million, 
allowing for an equity out of Euro 8.53 million considering an equity in of Euro 5.1 million. 
The developer made a bold move by starting a project in a secondary market. Under these conditions a 
speculative (i.e. with no pre-lease tenants) development might have proved a bad investment, however the 
successful marketing of the scheme allowed for the easily funded built-to-suit arrangement with a 65% loan-to-
value ratio. 
 
Project C    
 
The third project developed by the company was located in Bucharest central business district (CBD) 
within walking distance of Victoria Square. The building provides a gross lettable area of approximately of 
21,000 m² comprising offices and retail space and was built and let during 2008-2009, during the full swing of 
the crises. 
The land was bought in early 2004 for an amount of Euro 4.6 mil, and the development was funded by a 
mix of equity contribution of  Euro 3.4 mil and bank loan of Euro 35 million. The total yearly rent collected 
from tenants under triple net lease contracts is Euro 3.4 million. The current market value of the building stands 
at approximately Euro 44 million but the development was not sold for the time being due to not so favorable 
conditions on the real estate investment market. Even if the project is a high value building that attracted good 
financing terms from the bank, the equity capital cannot be recirculated and is currently blocked. The returns 
from such trapped capital are characteristic rather for a core investment strategy, as opposed to the aggressive 
typical strategy of a real estate developer, with return expectations exceeding 20% IRR. 
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Project D 
 
The fourth project was started by acquiring 10,200 square meters of land in a pioneering location in 
western Bucharest, in an area which saw the development of two shopping centers but no class A office 
buildings. The price paid for the acquisition was Euro 13.2 million and was justified by the possibility to build 
a 15 floors, 55,000 square meters class A office building. The company spent so far for the pre-construction 
architectural and marketing phase of the project an amount of Euro 3.2 million. The land acquisition and pre-
development to date was financed by a bank loan of Euro 12 million and a supplementary mezzanine loan (with 
a much higher interest) of Euro 1.5 million. Until now an amount of Euro 3.7 million was paid as interest 
payments. 
There are a number of challenges facing the company: in order to develop such a massive project that 
cannot be phased out, the banks are asking for pre-lease contracts exceeding 40% of the built surface. The weak 
leasing market cannot produce pre-lease contracts for big occupiers in order to match the bank requirement. 
Moreover, the market would allow for rents in the single digits while the pro-forma modeling of the project 
works with rents of 11-12 Euros per square meter. In the same time the loan to value requirements from banks 
are in the region of 50% (on top of that the necessity for pre-lease) making it necessary for the company to 
contribute 50% of development costs in equity. The weak leasing market and low rents to be achieved make the 
IRR on such an equity investment to be less attractive and the very large equity ticket make the project a 
challenge for the company.  
 
5.Conclusion 
 
Over time few issues have been as thoroughly researched as the reasons for which companies adopt a 
certain capital structures or another Gau  and Wang, 1990. Recent studies of developed real estate financing 
markets document that real estate companies tend to use favorable conditions on the financing and capital 
markets to their full extent. Ooi, Ong and Li 2010 demonstrate that US REITs time their capital structure 
decisions in an opportunistic manner in order to take advantage of opportunities on the financing markets.  
However the conclusion that seems to arise from examination of the real estate development companies active 
on the Romanian market is that the extent to which debt was used is clearly connected to the mythology of 
continuous growth, widely spread at the time  
In a very simplistic textbook approach, when considering capital structure risk/reward trade-offs decision 
making should concentrate on the analysis of the tax shield effect of using debt,  the bankruptcy risks in case of 
overleverage, the benefits from greater diversification brought by debt usage and, of course, the greater return 
on equity. In the case of real estate development companies active on the Romanian market we would argue 
that the debate that would put on one side the proponents of thrift and care in using debt and on the other side 
the investors that are betting their money on the leverage effect never took place. As the interviews with the 
managers of the company in question showed, the debt service coverage requirements were met by assuming 
very low level of voids (maximum of 7%), with no leakages (triple net rents) and the exit values were 
determined betting on the convergence theory and the squeeze of the yield spread between core markets and the 
periphery. In the project pro-forma the assumption for the sale price of project C had an exit yield of 6.2 % and 
for the exit price of project D an estimation of 7.3%. The rental levels were considered stable and safe long 
term, with maybe a slight (3-4%) decrease over 5-6 years due to more developments being delivered to the 
market. 
Regarding assumptions for the variations of interest rates, interviews showed that managers were 
considering the low cost of funds to be maintained long term, and were expecting more competition between 
lenders (with more foreign banks willing to enter the market). This factor would have triggered even better 
financing terms, on a par with the financing products available in core markets in Europe. In such 
circumstances the managers responsible for financing decisions at the time were trying to ensure a less costly 
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way out from current lending contracts in order to be able to take advantage of future improved financing terms 
by refinancing with other lenders about to enter the market. 
In some cases (for the project C) the managers agreed to take on additional cross-collateral obligations, 
considering that better terms would be obtained through refinancing, as there was no shortage of lenders. In 
fact, the very fact that the banks started in late 2008 to ask for supplementary guarantees (unusual at the time) 
should have ringed an alarm bell, but this did not happen. In the aftermath of Lehman Brother collapse, there 
was still optimism about the future of real estate.    
The effect of this epidemic of optimism was that companies used debt not based on calculating the tax 
shield effect, or various costs of debt, but they used debt simply as much as they could. The usual caveats that 
are designed to protect cash flow in unfavorable scenarios were set aside by using assumptions about the future. 
Most of the companies are using the scenario analysis tools with three usual types of assumptions: optimistic, 
realistic and pessimistic. In the case of Romanian real estate in particular, due to the mythology of continuous 
growth, banks and investors alike had pessimistic scenarios that now look completely unrealistic. 
The expectations of foreign capital upon entering frontier markets like Romania are that the risks 
embedded in a young economy will be covered by the growth prospects. In numbers this meant high IRRs. The 
high performance expectation was not covered by serious risk analysis because the pessimistic scenarios were 
in any case very optimistic about the future.  This meant in fact that companies took on too much debt for the 
developed projects because they could do it and because their risk analysis did not take into account all the 
black swans that could show up. 
In the aftermath of project A, the decision makers in the analyzed company allocated to Romania a much 
bigger chunk of capital, due to their perception of the relationship between risks and rewards. This also 
encouraged them to move to project B in a courageous location outside of the capital and to take on debt on a 
much larger and riskier scale for Project D- including a very expensive subordinated loan. 
such markets and to their perceptions of possible risks. If the meta-narrative of continuous growth is in place, 
the risks are almost non-existent and the logical conclusion is to take as much debt as possible in order to 
 
Regarding the sustainable level of debt, the analysis of the development projects shows that project A was 
sustainable because of the favourable investment market. The predictions about the future from the developer, 
the financing bank and the subsequent long term buyer were all positive and the 75% LTC looked even a bit 
conservative. For the developer the assumption was also sustainable because he could sell the building quickly. 
For the long term holder, variations in rents and voids might have created a situation where the loan covenants 
were breached and a solution had to be worked out with the bank.  To see the limits of leveraging we can take a 
look at project D. The high leverage did not help the project as many other assumptions were not accurate. In 
effect, the high leverage was not the problem of project D, but the entire strategy. Working out a solution with 
the bank for this development will require a lot of effort. Regarding risk management technics that would have 
worked, after a serious look at the properties in question and at the decision making process in the analysed 
company, it can be said that in fact there are no easily available risk management technics that would have 
prevented overleveraging in project D. The previous successes (project A and B) compelled the company to 
move quickly (and in the same time) to projects C and D. We can argue in retrospective that there were no 
methods or metrics to be calculated that could affect 
appreciation. The simplest tool of risk management, the cash flow simulation, should probably have taken into 
account vacancy levels of 25 % and rent decreases of 20%. But such proposition at the time would have not 
been taken into account. 
We can say in the end that the avoidance of risk would have come together with avoidance of 
opportunities, and this would have been very hard for managers to achieve. 
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